By Bulama Bukatarti
Reports indicate that Niger has officially withdrawn from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a regional military coalition strengthened to combat Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin. This decision is a major setback in the fight against violent extremism, with terrorist groups being the only beneficiaries. While all MNJTF members will feel the impact of this ill-advised move, Niger itself stands to suffer the most.
Security Implications
Niger’s withdrawal will weaken regional counterterrorism efforts, particularly along the Niger-Nigeria-Chad border, a key operational zone for terrorist groups. The consequences will likely include:
• Disrupting MNJTF operations and intelligence-sharing mechanisms
• Limiting cross-border military coordination
• Creating security gaps that Boko Haram and ISWAP can exploit
• Increasing attacks on civilians, military targets, and humanitarian efforts—especially within Niger
With this withdrawal, Niger’s section of the Lake Chad border will become more vulnerable, providing an escape route for Boko Haram and ISWAP fighters whenever they come under military pressure. Terrorists will move into areas where MNJTF troops are absent, using them as safe havens to regroup and launch further attacks. This is an act of self-sabotage, driven by political considerations rather than security needs.
A Misguided Justification
The military junta in Niger claims that the decision was made to redeploy troops to protect critical national assets, particularly oil pipelines. While safeguarding economic infrastructure is important, what kind of government prioritises pipelines over the lives of its citizens? Withdrawing security from villages, schools, markets, farms, and places of worship in favour of pipeline protection exposes ordinary Nigeriens to grave danger.
The Way Forward
To mitigate the damage caused by Niger’s exit, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad must step up their efforts. These countries, particularly Nigeria, should:
1. Deploy additional troops and resources to the MNJTF to cover the gap left by Niger’s withdrawal.
2. Invest in technology-driven intelligence gathering to compensate for the loss of Niger’s cooperation.
3. Engage in diplomatic efforts to persuade Niger to reconsider its decision and return to the MNJTF.
Niger’s withdrawal creates a dangerous security vacuum that Boko Haram and ISWAP are likely to exploit. If the junta in Niamey does not reverse course, the remaining MNJTF members must act swiftly and decisively to prevent further destabilisation.
